Tyler’s post and Ryan’s response from a few days got me thinking about the connection between natural law and morality. Is there an association between the two? If so, what’s the nature of their relationship?
To start off, I’d like to provide my own personal take on natural law and how it corresponds to our society. Each person’s interpretation of law is contingent upon their own cultural beliefs and values. A gay rights activist beliefs regarding the scope of law and it’s application will differ sharply from a hardline conservative. There is no universal perception of ideal law. Thus, nobody can claim to truly understand ideal law. We attempt to compensate for bias and prejudice in our own legal system through multiplicity. There are hundreds of lawmakers within our society (accounting for state general assemblies and congress) and several interpreters of the law (district court judges, circuit courts, the nine Supreme Court justices).
These legislators/policymakers, who control the direction of positive law, symbolize the moral values of our culture. Elections are an opportunity for the populace to express their opinion on public policy, which entails modifications or the repealing of old laws and the creation potential new ones. In this sense, election results are a mandate.
In my opinion, the concept of ideal law simply doesn’t accurately describe our society. Merely 8 years ago Congress was largely conservative and a Republican president had just been elected. Today, the converse is true. Is ideal law, which is based on our own moral values truly so capricious? Given the descriptions of a relatively static ideal law made by Aquinas and Cicero, it would appear that such a theory would not fit our society.
Tuesday, July 14, 2009
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Oddly, I think Aquinas and Cicero might agree with your observation that "There is no universal perception of ideal law. Thus, nobody can claim to truly understand ideal law." In other words, because positive law constitutes a group's perception or representation of what the law should be at any one time, it always falls short of the ideal. Natural law might work as a critical philosophy aimed at questioning the legitimacy of positive laws that seem to promote injustice on a local or even a global scale without advancing a comprehensive idea of what the law ideally ought to be.
ReplyDeleteReading the essential post, it can simply be implied that ideal law is the perception of the populace. Yes, a gay rights activist may have a different outlook on the morality of today’s laws, but we do live within a democracy. The majority does rule. We have a right to disagree with society, but the perception of the public will not alter. Compensating bias for our judicial officials is a complicated circumstance. I was recently watching Supreme Court Justice Sotomayor explain to Senator Jeff Sessions that her life experiences do not take part within her decisions as a judge. This is when you start to question whether or not select individuals are sided with the majority or the minority. You have the right to disagree as a citizen; however, do you judge with your morality or society’s?
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ReplyDelete"Natural law might work as a critical philosophy aimed at questioning the legitimacy of positive laws that seem to promote injustice on a local or even a global scale without advancing a comprehensive idea of what the law ideally ought to be."
ReplyDeleteI can see your point in Natural Law's utility in questioning the legitimacy of unjust laws. However, I disagree that it can do it without advancing an idea of what the law ideally ought to be.
It is meaningless to argue that a law is unjust without having some criteria for determining justice. My understanding was that the existence of a set of ideal (i.e. perfectly just) laws is what provides a basis for determining the justice of positive law. Thus, if Natural Law is to be applied to anything but the most abstract philosophical thought experiments, some coherent ethos or morality has to be given.
In other words: How can I trust you when you say that this law is unlike the Ideal laws, when you won't even tell me what you think the ideal laws are like?